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BACKGROUND: In view of the fact that payment systems for physicians may affect the 
efficiency and effectiveness of health care service provision, the design of compensation 
schemes is a major policy concern. According to standard labour economics and agency 
theory, fee-for-service and debatably pay for performance contracts are likely to provoke 
higher service production than salary contracts and capitation contracts. Compensation 
systems may also power service quality and the overall cost control. Regardless of the 
obvious policy significance of these issues, the accessible empirical research is very 
limited. This paper is a challenge to remedy this situation by addressing the impact of 
different contracts and payment systems on primary care physicians‘ service supply in 
Norway, UK and investigate if there are lessons Ghana can learn from these two countries. 
METHOD: a search strategy was tailored to systematically identify relevant studies from 
Norway and UK. The following databases were searched: Econlit, Medline, and Google 
Scholar. Free text searches were carried out on the databases listed above with terms such 
as; salary or fee-for-service or capitation or reimbursement or payment for performance or 
quality and outcomes framework or incentive in juxtaposition with the following: general 
practitioner or family physician or general practice or primary health care or primary 
physician in either Norway or United Kingdom. Out of the results, ten studies with 
different methods were selected for the review. 
RESULTS: The outcomes of the literature review give mixed effects of the different 
methods of physician compensation in Norway and UK.  P4P or QOF were known to give 
strong incentives for improvement of quality of care after its introduction in 2004. 
Capitation was found to motivate GPs to increase their referral rates which would 
eventually increase cost of specialists‘ treatment and hence higher health care expenditure. 
However, the predictions from theory were not fully supported by the literature review on 
the effects of fee-for-service or salary. 
CONCLUSION: The findings of this study show that the selection of payment methods 
for GPs is not a nonaligned verdict and has considerable practice and policy connotations. 
Therefore, any attempt to implement any of the methods of paying GPs must be based on 
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1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Governments and Health policy makers in different countries have used healthcare 
reforms to influence the clinical behaviour of primary care Physicians. Primary care 
physicians act as gatekeepers and also spokesmen for patients. In the light of these roles, 
their payment methods be it capitation, fee-for-service, salary or pay for performance have 
implications on cost, quality of service delivery, physician satisfaction, patient satisfaction 
etc. Plan arrangements with physician groups start with one of three basic pure forms; 
salary, fee-for-service and capitation (Glazer 1970). All over Europe and North America, 
health authorities are or have reformed their general practice, especially in terms of 
physician payment methods. Many researchers have confirmed with empirical data the 
hypothesis that the ways physician are paid have influence on their clinical behaviour.‖ 
But physicians are also social and economic beings; their behaviour is, in part, determined 
by the way they are reimbursed‖ (Gabel R, 2000). 
 
Thus, the design of financial incentives must be done on appropriate basis and with much 
knowledge about the effects of each payment method.  Scheming payment systems that 
promote efficiency and equity requires understanding, facts and data not only of the 
objectives themselves but also of the consequences of different systems of payment on 
those variables relevant to the objectives, such as the use of resources and patient welfare.
1
 
There are studies proving that financial incentives can influence GP behaviour and that 
there is a rareness of research into the effects of remunerating GPs in different ways. The 
issue now is that, researchers should consider undertaking quantitative studies to throw 
more light on the effects of different methods of payment and also the combined effect of 
a blend system of any kind. 
Many countries have now moved away from the system of single payment methods 
because of the devastating bad effects and have now adopted a blend system just to dilute 
the weaknesses of single system and reap the advantages mixed systems offer. Some 
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systems link payment directly with output which tend GPs to increase their services in 
order to increase income
2
. These drawbacks of relating payment to output , or fee for 
service, has lead many countries , an example is the UK, to the organization of a health 
care system which either split the link between compensation and output or at least 
rigorously adulterates its effects. Norway is another typical example of a blend system of 
payment. Though economic theory would argue that FFS payment method for GPs may be 
less cost effective there are counter balancing arguments, that formal ethical code and 
medical guidelines to which GPs are supposed to stick on. If such strong ethical guidelines 
exist, it could dilute or remove the motivation for GPs to provide ineffective, dubious or 




Furthermore, other systems of payment such as capitation in Norway have their own 
problems. For example, capitation method may be inefficient as it promotes competition 
for patients by GPs on the basis of quality of their care, so that by attracting more patients 
their income increases. This assumption of quality of care depends on the capacity of the 
patient to observe with full information which is an unconvincing assumption. In the 
nutshell, a satisfactory level of cure must rely on the doctors own ethical code of conduct. 
Again, the UK government perceiving these dangers of capitation introduced a whole 
range of financial incentives to motivate primary care physicians to meet up public health 
objectives. 
―There are many mechanisms for paying physicians; some are good and some are bad. The 
three worst are fee-for-service, capitation, and salary. Fee-for-service rewards the 
provision of inappropriate services, the fraudulent upcoding of visits and procedures, and 
the churning of ―ping-pong‖ referrals among specialist. Capitation rewards the denial of 
appropriate services, the dumping of the chronically ill, and a narrow scope of practice 
that refers out every time-consuming patient. Salary undermines productivity, condones 
on-the-job leisure, and fosters a bureaucratic mentality in which every procedure is 
someone else‘s problem‖ ( Robinson J.C 2001).  Ghana is one of the typical developing 
countries that use salary method of paying primary care physicians. The new NHIS 
introduced in 2004 aimed at improving access and equity has been a major health reform 
in Ghana after independence in 1957. Prior to the reforms, provision of healthcare services 
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was financed by mainly out-of-pocket payments by patients. With such a major reform, 
there was much expectation that the primary care physicians will receive their fair share of 
the financing arrangements. To the surprise of many, Ghana‘s primary care physicians are 
still reimbursed mainly by salary. Thus the Ghanaian system has failed to recognize and to 
dilute the deadly effect of salary as a method of primary care physician remuneration. May 
be it is about time the country considered looking into the possibility of implementing an 
innovative methodology in physician remuneration. 
 
 In response to major challenges in the recruitment and retention of doctors in Ghana, the 
Ghanaian Federal Government in 1998 instituted a scheme known as the Additional Duty 
Hours Allowance (ADHA) Scheme
4
. This is a salary support system that rewards 
physicians for putting in extra hours of working. Primary care physicians can then increase 
their income by working more hours. In Ghana, public discussion, researchers, ministry of 
health and the Ghana health service tend to ignore the effects of physician payment 
methodology. Instead the general emphasis has been on the adequacy of the payment 
methods. So almost, there is non-existent of research work on the effect of physician 
payment systems in Ghana. However, Ghana cannot deny both the good and the bad 
effects of salary system of payment which has lead many countries to seek for middle 
ground between low and piece rates and straight salary. 
 
It must be noted that physician behaviour may not necessarily be a response to only the 
financial incentives given, but other non-price mechanisms; monitoring, rewarding 
appropriate behaviour, promotion, socialization, profiling and practice ownership. 
Therefore Ghana may not rely on financial incentives to control physician behaviour in 
terms of resource utilization, but other ways as stated above. From this background, it is 
clear that the system in Ghana is quite different from both the UK and the Norwegian 
system of remuneration for primary care physicians. The context, health policy and the 
background for each of the three countries understudy forms the basis for the design of 
physician payment method.  
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 Financial incentives to improve quality of care, sometimes called pay for performance 
schemes, have been introduced recently in many countries, including the United States, 
Spain, and Australia. The United Kingdom embarked on the most ambitious of these 
schemes in 2004 with an initiative in which 25% of general practitioners‘ pay was tied to a 
complex set of quality indicators, the quality and outcomes framework. In common with 
other countries, most of the indicators in the original UK framework related to clinical 
care. 
 
Earlier in 1980s, primary care physicians rejected the so-called Practice Allowance on the 
basis of the fact that quality cannot be measured. The 1990s were the years of evidence-
based medicine, when clinical professionals and policy makers came to the notion that 
there were better and worse ways of medical practising with justifiable limitations to 
individual autonomy in the healthcare locale.  Also healthcare researchers established that 
there were extensive dissimilarities in the practice of medicine and that many patients 
were receiving less care than appropriate. The collective upshot of these conceptions was 
that it became progressively more important both to characterize high-quality care and to 
make available procedures that could be applied to evaluate some facet of the quality of 
care. To tie a substantial proportion of physicians‘ income to the quality of the care they 
provided would produce winners and losers. However, the British Medical Association 
was unlikely to negotiate a change in remuneration that would result in the loss of income 
for large numbers of its members. Therefore, the scale of the change that came about was 
possible only because in 2000 the government of the United Kingdom decided to provide 
a substantial increase in health expenditure (Roland Martin, 2004). 
 
UK primary care physicians are independent contractors with the National Health Service 
(NHS), and they enjoy some considerable autonomy. Like the Norwegian health care 
system, every NHS patient is registered with a GP, who is a gatekeeper to NHS secondary 
specialist care and a spokesman for the patient. Earlier before the reforms in April 2004, 
the UK health system exhibited a ―primary care-led ―system where physicians are in 
charge of the local health system. A major character of the UK primary care system until 
the reforms in 2004 is the mixed system of remuneration methods; fee-for-service (about 
15% of GP income), capitation (40 percent of GP income), salary (30 percent of GP 
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income), and capital and information technology (IT) (15 percent).  The new GP contract 
is infused with a major change to the primary care incentives where primary care 
physicians‘ income is based on other quality measures. Thus, in addition to the blend 
system of physician remuneration in UK, physicians have quality targets and standards to 
meet and about 18 percent of their income is spread on the basis of quality measures. The 
main purpose of the reform is to reward practices rather than individual physicians so it 




The Norwegian health care system exhibits all the three methods of payment just as the 
UK health care system. The system in Norway is not exactly the same as the UK system; 
there exist some variability. This variability may be due to dissimilarities between 
governments and policy makers in their health care goals, the structure and organization of 
their health care sectors and the culture of the respective medical profession. Lack of 
consensus as to which type of payment system that has the most favourable impact on 
primary care physicians‘ behaviour may also be a justification for the variation6.  Norway 
introduced a list patient or what we call capitation in 2001 where every patient is 
registered with a primary care physician. The essence of this policy was to maintain a 
stable relationship among primary care physicians and their patients
7
.  In Norway, fixed 
salary, capitation, and fee-for service are the common methods of paying primary care 
physicians. Primary care physicians must fulfil certain requirements regarding opening 
hours and or working hours for his or her salary. Primary care physicians are paid a 
compensation for each registered person on his or her list of patients. Primary care 
physicians are also paid for every service they provide under the fee-for-service method in 
Norway. From the above, it is clear that some countries blend two or more of the methods 
of paying primary care physicians. Ghana seems to be solely paying primary care 
physicians by salaries among the three countries under.  
 
Many a time public debate over payment methods fail to consider the implications of a 
mixed system. Instead, reviews have cantered on the nature and the effect of a particular 




 Godson T, Forland F, Kristiansen IS, Sutten M, Leese B, Giuffrida A, Sergison M, Perdersen L, April 
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method. As already stated, a physician‘s clinical behaviour may not necessarily be a direct 
response to the way they are paid because there could be other nonprice means that needs 
to be incorporated into the theory of incentive contracting of physicians. This paper 
describes and analysis the impacts of physician payment methods; either single methods or 
mixed system. This description and analysis cannot be meaningful without resorting to 
both the conceptual and theoretical framework on incentive contracting and how 
physicians are paid by insurers or their own medical group. Agency theory would be 
employed in the context of imperfect information, risk aversion and information problems 
that may hinder achieving a particular health objective. This description would be centred 
on Norway, UK and Ghana.  Thus, the description and the discussion will look at explicit 
objectives of physician payment methods, and the impact of the three most common 
methods and the innovations that blend two or more methods and the new QOF. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
Of late many developed countries have reformed their general practice especially in the 
area of physician payment methods. Many of these changes have occurred against a 
background of little empirical evidence about the impacts of different forms of payments 
and that of a mixed system of primary physician payment on the cost of care and on the 
welfare of patients
8
. Thus without more research work and empirical evidence, these 
reforms may not be attuned with the efficiency and equity objectives of health care.  
 
Manipulation of payment methods in an attempt to achieve policy objectives such as 
improving quality of care, cost containment and recruitment to under-served areas  should 
be tested and evaluated against health care goals and desired outcome. UK, Ghana and 
Norway have different experiences in the area of physician remuneration. Many 
researchers have concluded that fee-for-service creates the incentives to deliver more 
service than appropriate in order to increase income. This can lead to supplier induced 
demand (SID) (Evans 1974) where patients would receive more care than they would have 
chosen if they had the requisite understanding.  
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Salaried physician may not have the incentive for a particular care to be provided since 
physicians know their income in advance before any care is given. On the other hand, 
capitation leads to physicians having bigger patient lists sizes just to increase their income 
but then the workload may increase as well which will lead to shorter consultations and 
higher referral rates. Thus however, each of these methods presents both positive and 
negative outcomes; salary and capitation may contain cost but they could encourage 
under-treatment while fee-for-service may encourage over-treatment
9
.  The new QOF has 
its own implications. There is a belief that quality and accessibility could be achieved with 
pay for performance. In effect then, it is difficult to draw major conclusion as to which 
type of payment method is better on patient health status since both under/over-treatment 
can be injurious to patient health. Norway, Ghana and the UK may have different 
experiences with these methodologies. 
 
Based on the research problem, the following questions need critical consideration: 
To what extent has the health sector reform, in particular, physician payment methods, 
impacted on the quality of health care delivery to patients? What impacts or effects have 
the different methodologies brought to bear on the health care objectives in terms of cost 
containment?  What effects has capitation on GPs referral decisions? What challenges 
have service users and physicians themselves been facing in accessing Health Care/giving 
services under the various methods? These and other issues underpinned the researcher‘s 
interest to investigate the impact of the physician payment methods. 
 
The main objective of the study is to investigate and describe the impact of physician 
payment methods in UK, Norway and make evaluation of whether or not the experiences 
in Norway and UK have any relevance in Ghana given the socio-economic, policy and 
cultural context. The outcome of this descriptive review should help the governments of 
these three countries especially Ghana, to appreciate the extent to which the physician 
payment methods have impacted on the health of service users, patient satisfaction, cost 
and equity of service delivery. In practice, the study would bring to the fore the views of 
researchers about the physician payment methods and the challenges associated with 
different systems. This will aid planning and monitoring of policies aimed at improving 
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access to health care services.  The study would thus be of use to health policy 
practitioners in their decision making processes especially in the area of primary care 
physicians‘ remuneration. 
 
This description is also being undertaken with the intention of broadening our knowledge 
and understanding of the impact of the different methodologies in physician 
reimbursement systems in general and how these methods have been of benefit to service 
users. It is hoped that the findings of this research would offer an opportunity to discuss 
theoretical and empirical insights into how the payment mechanisms should be couched to 
meet the tailored needs of service users.  It will also identify vital areas that require further 
research. 
 
1.3 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY  
A study of physician payment methods in Norway, Ghana and UK is very wide as there 
have been many reform policies in recent times. As stated earlier, these reforms have 
looked at physicians as gatekeepers to the health sector and also spokesmen for patients 
and that their decisions have a lot of impact on the cost of health care and patient health 
status. This description would focus only on the effects of payment methods on the clinical 
behaviour of primary care physicians. Thus the study would consider the effects of salary, 
capitation and fee-for-service and pay for performance and a comparative discussion of 
these three countries. 
 
Due to the fact that not so much has been written about this area especially in Ghana, it 
will not be easy to get much literature on the topic hence data and therefore this 
descriptive study will be limited to the extent to which books, articles, journals, internet 
sources will permit. Inadequacy of literature and secondary data in some instances will 
limit the extent to which closer description and evaluation can be made and also made it 
difficult to substantiate some of the arguments.  Narrative or descriptive review would be 





1.4 STRUCTURE OF PRESENTATION OF THE STUDY 
The study has been organized into 7 chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1: This highlights the background to the study including the circumstances that 
motivated the research work, the problem statement, and objectives of the study, 
significance of the study, and scope and limitations of the study. It seems from the 
literature on physician remuneration that there is a general consensus that primary care 
physicians respond to the way they are paid. This gives significance to economic theory 
and common sense. The three traditional ways of paying primary care physicians are fee-
for-service, capitation and salary.  
However, countries like the UK have performance based mechanisms that have improved 
their healthcare systems in terms of accessibility, efficiency and prevention and control of 
certain (chronic) diseases. Thus another important form of remuneration is the quality and 
outcomes framework (QOF) or pay for performance (P4P). In 2004, the United Kingdom 
committed £1.8 billion ($3.2 billion) to a new pay-for-performance contract for family 
practitioners (Stephen Campbell, Ph.D., David Reeves, Evangelos Kontopantelis, 
Elizabeth Middleton, Bonnie Sibbald, and Martin Roland, 2007).  
Chapter 2: This section puts payment systems into the right economic sense and elaborates 
on the relationship between agents and principals.  The study also employs within this 
chapter, the principal -agent theory as the theoretical framework for describing and 
discussing the context of physician payment methods which falls within the larger 
literature of incentive and financial contracting. Means of paying primary care physicians 
is a form of financial contract between individual    physician and a bigger corporation like 
government, insurer, a medical group or a sponsor. Because of such relationship, a full 
description of the effects of payment methods on physician clinical behaviour must 
embody the larger literature on contract and financial incentives called agency theory.  A 
summary of payment methods and theoretical predictions have been tabulated at the end of 
this section. 
 
Chapter 3: The introductory part of chapter one will introduce the differences and reforms 
in UK and Norway health systems. In this chapter, a brief description of health care 
systems in UK and Norway is presented including possible primary health care objectives. 
Every primary health care system has priorities and targets depending on the health care 
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objectives. One outstanding goal that cuts across almost all health systems is to provide 
equitable and universal accessibility of health service to all the population. Moreover, cost 
control and containment among others is very prominent in recent times because many 
systems are suffering from escalating healthcare budgets.  
Chapter 4: This contains methodology and a descriptive review of existing literature on 
physician payment mechanisms and their effects on their clinical behaviour. It will throw 
light on the historical development of incentive contracting and payment methods for 
primary care physicians and how the various payment methods in other countries have 
impacted on the quality of health care delivery; cost containment, patient satisfaction etc. 
A search of the literature on physician incentives and their effects will be undertaken and 
the relevant literature would be picked for the review. Much of the literature would centre 
on the UK and the Norwegian experiences in terms of primary care physician payment 
methods and the effects they have on the clinical behaviour of the primary care physicians. 
Relevant examples would also be drawn from different settings to broaden the scope of the 
study so as to be able to draw both the theoretical and practical differences between 
different healthcare systems. 
Physicians‘ payment designs can shape the quantity of services provided, the number of 
hours worked, how resourcefully the physician works and the quality of the services 
provided, whether physicians refer patients to specialists or hospitals rather than treating 
them themselves, and finally, the overall cost of physician services. This Chapter will 
describe the systems as they are, look out for findings and conclusions of other studies and 
review them in order to draw conclusions from the empirical evidences available. Books, 
articles and other relevant journals would be consulted. 
 
Chapter 5: This chapter would focus on the possible lessons Ghana can learn and if 
possible adopt from the literature reviewed. Ghana embarked on health care financing 
reform which saw the old way of out of pocket payment discarded. The intention of the 
Government is to create equal access and encourage people to contribute to the new health 
insurance system among others. This objective and others require the cooperation of GPs 





 Chapter 6:   This chapter contains discussion of the included studies against the research 
questions. Both positive and negative effects of each payment method would be examined 
with relevant against the existing theoretical predictions. For example it is known that 
under capitation as a prospective payment method, primary care physicians know in 
advance the amount of payment they will receive before they offer care. This will 
encourage physicians to at least contain cost since the physician cannot increase his 
income by offering more care. This theoretical principle for example, would be discussed 
against the practical evidence available from various studies included in this dissertation. 
Chapter 7: This offers conclusions and recommendations for possible adoption and 
implementation by stakeholders. Many available studies show evidence of the correlation 
between payment methods and the clinical behaviour of primary care physicians. 
Researchers‘ evidence suggests that primary care physicians paid by fee-for-service offer 
greater quantity of care service compared with capitation or salary. Thus, the concern of 
political decision makers to contain cost could be thwarted if more robust systems are not 
adopted. Salary and capitation have the tendency to offer under treatment which could be 
harmful. It will therefore not be out of place to say that each method has its own pros and 
cons and thus their adoption should be based on the healthcare objective of a particular 
policy context. For example, Ghana‘s socio-economic conditions may not favour fee-for-













2.0 PAYING PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS 
2.1 PAYMENT METHODS AND AGENCY THEORY 
 Means of paying primary care physicians is a form of financial contract between 
individual    physician and a bigger corporation like government, insurer, a medical group 
or a sponsor. Because of such relationship, a full description of the effects of payment 
methods on physician clinical behaviour must embody the larger literature on contract and 
financial incentives called agency theory
10
.  An agency relationship arises whenever one 
or more individuals, called principals, hire one or more other individuals, called agents, to 
perform some service and then delegate decision-making authority to the agents. The 
primary agency relationships in business are those (1) between stockholders and managers 
and (2) between debt holders and stockholders. These relationships are not necessarily 
harmonious; indeed, agency theory is concerned with so-called agency conflicts, or 
conflicts of interest between agents and principals. This has implications for, among other 
things, corporate governance and business ethics. When agency occurs, it also tends to 
give rise to agency costs, which are expenses incurred in order to sustain an effective 
agency relationship (e.g., offering management performance bonuses to encourage 
managers to act in the shareholders' interests).  
 
Accordingly, agency theory has emerged as a dominant model in the financial economics 
literature, and is widely discussed in business ethics texts and applied both in the public 
and private sector. Agency theory raises a fundamental problem in organizations—self-
interested behaviour. Agents may have personal goals that compete with the principal's 
goal of maximization or optimization. Since the principal authorizes the agent to 
administer the organization assets, a potential conflict of interest exists between the two 
groups. Agency theory suggests that, in imperfect labour and capital markets, managers 
will seek to maximize their own utility at the expense of corporate shareholders. Agents 
have the ability to operate in their own self-interest rather than in the best interests of the 
firm because of asymmetric information (e.g., agents know better than principals whether 
they are capable of meeting the principals' objectives) and uncertainty (e.g., innumerable 
                                                 
10
 Milgron and Roberts 1992;  Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985; Sappington 1991 
19 
 
factors contribute to final outcomes, and it may not be evident whether the agent directly 
caused a given outcome, positive or negative). Evidence of self-interested managerial 
behaviour includes the consumption of some corporate resources in the form of perquisite 
and the avoidance of optimal risk positions, whereby risk-averse agents bypass profitable 
opportunities in which the firm's principals would prefer they invest. Outside investors 
recognize that the firm will make decisions contrary to their best interests. Accordingly, 
investors will discount the prices they are willing to pay for the firm's securities. 
 
Within this context, primary care physicians cannot be exempted from these predictable 
problems that may superimpose the agent‘s interest over that of the principal. Therefore 
the design of the structure of incentive systems for physicians ought to give reference to 
this theory. It is vital to make out between the level of compensation and (the amount 
expected to be paid to the agent by the principal) and the structure of compensation (the 
style in which compensation is linked to specific measures of performance). The amount 
of payment must be equal to or more than the amount the agent could receive in other 
occupations and, in the situation of primary physician payment, will be resolved by 
inherent social judgements concerning the expenditures necessary for attracting talented 
individuals into the profession (Prendergast 1999).  
  
The structure of compensation, which is the main concern of this study, is premeditated to 
offer the highest compensation to the agent at the lowest cost to the principal. Differences 
in the compensation among professions are explained by economic theory as reflecting the 
features of the assignments and the persons who perform them, including the level to 
which performance is easily observed and appraised, the degree to which persons are 
averse to risk, the degree to which the considered necessary behaviour consists of one or 
compound tasks, and the degree to which collaboration between many agents is a central 
feature of the job to be carried out.  
 
Conceptually, piece-rate is quite a simple payment method that offers commanding and by 
far performance incentive linked to effort, as measured by number of seed planted or shirt 
sewn. Piece-rates payment is analogous to spot contracting among firms, and aligns 
incentives well in contexts where the required behaviour is simple and easily measured 
20 
 
(MacNeil 1978). In the context of primary care physician payments, fee-for-service is on 
the whole, obvious example of piece-rate. In this case, every clinical assignment is 
assigned a distinctive identifier that allows indexing and conversion into monetary units. 
Both within and outside medicine, fee-for-service is infrequent whiles many professions 
adopt low-incentivised forms of payment with frail link between performance and 
compensation (capitation and salary for example). Ubiquity of alternative payment 
mechanisms testifies to the fragility of piece rates in the context of incomplete 
information, risk aversion and wiliness of agents to pursue self-interest with guile when 
the opportunity arises (Robinson James C. 2001). 
 
In principle, piece rates will render the principal to abuse in the contexts where the agent‘s 
specific activities undertaken cannot be observed and evaluated. The agent is therefore 
incentivised to render service and care beyond the lowest amount necessary to achieve the 
principal‘s goals. There is much incentive to work more in order to gain more. In general, 
piece-rates and other retrospective payment methods of payment result in an input-
intensive form of service that burns up resources as they had no substitute use and enjoys 
life as if there were tomorrow.  On the other hand, prospective forms of payment for 
example the Norwegian DRG pre-bid rates system for hospital care and capitation for 
primary care motivate a more economical and cost-effective form of production. 
 
Prospective payments however have their own shortcomings. Cost to the principal may not 
necessarily come wholly from the effort of the agent but other factors that agent has no 
control over; macro and microeconomic conditions, weather etc). 
Prospective payments expose the agent to financial risk to the extent that definite 
compensation may be higher or lesser than the amount required inducing the desired 
behaviour from the agent (Penner 1997).  Since the agent is risk averse, he will bargain for 
extra compensation for accepting the risk of income underperformance yet there may be 
equal probability of income over performance. Here the principal‘s duty is to design 
payment structure that will minimize the risk premium demanded by the agent to mirror 
the agent‘s own performance which consequently swings the payment structure back to 
piece rates. In most policy context, the design of incentive systems for physician will 
intermingle components of prospective (capitation and salary) and retrospective (fee-for-
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service) by integrating base salaries, commissions, bonuses, profit sharing, and other 
ingenious methodologies.  
 
Sometimes, the agent can take actions with different expected cost and so transferring risk 
from the principal to the agent may be endangered to a certain degree because the agent 
can possibly choose an action from among many different actions with the least cost. Such 
action may conflict the desired performance which the principal believes can achieve his 
target. Prospective payment methods, for example salaries can increase the tendency for 
agents to repudiate jobs which are more difficult. A prospective payment in health care 
exposes the provider of services to extra costs, and hence lowers net income, for treating 
patients with more severe underlying disease and greater need for time and services 
(Newhouse 1996). Some health care systems have tried to bridge the variation in costs in 
treating patients with more severe illness by adjusting payment rates for the expected 
degree of the patient‘s illness.  
 
The Norwegian DRG and the USA Medicare DRG have age and sex adjustments for 
physician capitation rates. However, there is a belief that these adjustments may not 
necessarily account fully for the variation in costs of treating capitated patients. Some 
physicians receive too much payments whiles others receive less in adjustment. The 
tendency here is that low-paid physicians may leave the market or try to avoid treating 
patients with greater severity and high cost of treatment. On the other hand, overpaid 
providers or physicians will harvest unmerited compensation (Chone 2004). 
In the contexts where the conduct desired of the agent consists of different jobs with some 
easily observed and others unobserved, the principal faces a complicated design challenge. 
If compensation is linked to performance the agent is enticed to put in more efforts and 
time in the jobs that are easily observed and paid in order to increase earnings (Homstrom 
and Milgrom 1991). GPs under QOF may be enticed to offer more services in order to 
increase earnings. 
 
Agency problems pose a design challenge for health care sponsors and governments to the 
extent that pure forms of either capitation or fee-for-service may not be optimized 
structures of compensation for physician services. No wonder many advanced health care 
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systems have adopted a mixed system of payments that dilute the disadvantages of pure 
capitation and fee-for-service.  Many writers have looked at the key characteristics of 
clinical practice in terms of economic incentives. First, payment method is linked to 
physician output and patient service; medicine is a face-to-face and one-to-one provision 
in which physicians and clinicians are to be motivated to work for longer hours, execute 
many clinical procedures and pay attention to the needs of every individual patient. In this 
context, fee-for-service or QOF can have a great impact in getting physicians undertake 
the required actions in view of the fact that physicians earn more when they offer more 
service to patients. Clearly, prospective payments like capitation will not encourage 
physicians to offer more since payment is not tied to performance and the number of 
services, tests, procedures undertaken etc. Capitation sometimes over rewards physicians 
who offer less service and care whiles some of them are paid less even though they may 
offer many multifaceted services and procedures.  
 
Another dimension of clinical practice is the fact that physicians are risk acceptors in that 
they treat and manage most or sickest patients. There shouldn‘t be any reward for 
physicians who avoid sicker patients in favour of healthy ones. Again fee-for-service or 
QOF is the option here since more is paid to physicians for treating patients who need 
more care and service like those with chronic diseases whiles less income is paid for 
treating healthy patients who need less treatment and care. Capitation executes very badly 
in this context because physicians know their income in advance irrespective of their 
performance.  
 
To some extent, physicians can be motivated to increase their efforts when payment is 
adjusted for sex, age and severity of sickness. However, as already argued, even a well-
adjusted capitation may not be able to make up for the variations in treatment costs among 
patients so in this case fee-for-service P4P would offer the right motivation for physicians 
to be compensated extra for accepting to treat patients with deteriorating conditions. 
Efficiency and appropriate scope of service is a vital feature of clinical practice where 
physicians are entreated to offer appropriate service to patients by avoiding overtreatment 
and undertreatment. Incentive systems should pay physicians who choose appropriate 
action at the right time and in the right environment. Fee-for-service motivates physicians 
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to offer needless service simply because they can do the wrong thing and still be paid for 
it. For the physician under fee-for-service, every referral is a lost fee to the extent that 
patients could be upcoded and made to return for further treatment even if the treatment 
would not be appropriate.  
 
Clearly, capitation and other prospective payment methods seem to offer financial remedy 
to this supplier-induced demand. Capitation pulls a break on offering more service than 
needed to treat patients because physicians do not increase their income by offering more 
service.  
Finally, physicians have been encouraged to bridge the gap in offering different treatment 
to patients with almost same or similar symptoms across the healthcare system. 
Evidenced-based medicine and cooperation among physicians and specialists should be a 
priority. Here it can be argued that fee-for-service is limited in achieving this objective. It 
provides no payment for adopting practice style, cooperation etc. Capitation could inspire 
greater cooperation and practice patterns in appropriate settings heartening resource-
conserving attitudes and behaviour. 
 
2.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF PAYMENT METHODS: PREDICTIONS 
FROM THEORY. 
Physicians‘ incentive systems have been viewed from different dimensions. 
One of the major areas of concern is the link between the physicians‘ income 
and their activities. This will invariably determine whether the physicians‘ 
payments are related to their actual cost or not. These among other different 
characteristics will possibly influence physicians‘ behaviour in diverse ways. 









1.1 Summary of payment methods 
Payment method Definition  Implications / Predictions  
Fee-for-service This is where payment 
is made for each 
service such as office 
visit, procedure or 
other health care 
service 
Tendency to over-prescribe, over-
diagnose, over-treat to secure more 
revenue since physicians earn a net 
profit on each visit, and procedure 
carried out (Evans 1974). More 
incentive to intensify treatment just to 
increase income. Physicians may 
induce demand for health care and 
service where patient constraints may 
exists. Low referral rate since every 
referral is a lost fee (Woodward 
1984). Accessibility to health service 
and care is very high since physicians 
do not face any financial risk for the 
intensive care provided (Hellinger 
1996).  
capitation Where payment is 
made to a physician for 
every patient on their 
lists. Health care 
service providers 
(physicians), are paid a 
set amount for each 
enrolled person 
assigned to that 
physician, whether or 
not that person seeks 
care, per period of 
time. 
Since capitation does not reimburse 
physicians any more for taking care of 
their patients, and visits and 
procedures cost money, the 
contracting physician essentially lose 
money for every visit or procedure. 
This situation incentivizes the 
physician to reduce the effort spent on 
each patient which could increase 
referral rates (Maynard 1986). The 
corollary practice is to under-treat, 
under-diagnose to reduce cost 
(Gosden 1999). Physicians may 
compete for patients by increasing 
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quality of their service. Also, 
physicians may want to avoid high 
costs by offering preventive care 
(Shimmura 1988). Unadjusted 
capitation may encourage physicians 
to deselect sicker patients (Matsaganis 
1994).  
salary Where a lump sum 
payment is made to a 
general practitioner for 
a set number of 
working hours or 
sections per week 
Amount is fixed irrespective of output 
levels. Cost and expenses are known 
in advance (Woodward 1984). No 
reward for quality and efficiency as 
well as ensuring accessibility.  No 
incentive for resource utilization.  
Low-powered system with weak link 
between payment and performance. 
No financial risk (Rosen 1989). 
 
 












3.0 HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN UK AND NORWAY 
 3.1 PRIMARY CARE OBJECTIVES 
Most primary care organizations are identified with set goals and objectives. The ultimate 
goal is to offer better health for all (WHO). However, different healthcare systems may 
have specific targets. In general, policy makers would want to achieve some of the 
following. 
1. Universal coverage: reducing exclusion and social disparity in healthcare and creating 
room for open accessibility and equity, health resources should be distributed fairly so that 
nobody is denied access to essential care. 
2. Sustainability: the primary health system can continue to achieve its goals using 
available resources. Reforms and policies should be adopted when they can be sustained 
and improved.  
3. Efficiency, Cost containment and control: Health improvements should be achieved at 
the lowest possible cost. In an era when many countries spend considerable fraction of 
GDP on health care, steps must be taken to make sure that health expenditures do not 
exceed targets whiles efficiency is being achieved. 
4. Quality: Appropriate and safe clinical services, adequate amenities, skilled staff, and 
essential drugs, supplies, and equipment should be available. 
5. Client responsiveness: The system should meet people‘s expectations and protect their 
rights, including their rights to individual dignity, privacy, autonomy in decision making, 









 3.2 NORWEGIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
General Practitioners are key providers of health care and they act as the gatekeepers for 
Norwegian healthcare sector. This role puts them as the first point of contact during times 
of illness. General Practitioners then will decide on the level of treatment, length of 
consultation, prescription of medication and the decision to send patients to specialists.  
Thus their role in the health care sector determines the success or otherwise of the health 
care  sector; cost containment, accessibility to health care, rate of referrals, right utilization 
of medical resources etc.   
In 2001, Norway reformed its General Practice where a list patient system called 
capitation was introduced. This system ensures that every resident is registered with a 
General Practitioner and the General Practitioner will have a list of patients to offer 
service to. This reform is intended to cement the contractual relationship between a 
General Practitioner and a patient in a stable relationship and also offer every individual a 
General Practitioner ( Luras 2003). It is believed that the reform came with a lot of merits 
as compared with the old system. General Practitioners are now paid on a mixed system 
basis; fixed salary, capitation and fee-for-service. General Practitioners on fixed salary are 
required to fulfil definite requirements concerning opening hours and/ or working hours. 
Fee-for-service constitutes payment related to the General Practitioners provision of 
service to patients.  Capitation pays General Practitioners for the number of registered 
patients on their list. Even though some systems are based exclusively on one of these 
methods, but a mixed system where two or more of these methods are usually used and 
here the Norwegian system combines more than one of the above methods. 
 
In the period preceding the reform of the Norwegian General practice, private General 
Practitioners were paid partly by fee-for-service, practice allowance component and 
salaries. Salaried physicians represented approximately 19% of primary care physicians, 
and were employed by the municipalities and received a salary. About 66% of primary 
care physicians were contract physicians. Now, the new system has done away with 
practice allowance and has been replaced by capitation. And fee-for-service now 
constitutes a larger part of General Practitioners income in the new system than before. 
Practice allowance constituted 40% of an average General practitioners income and fee-
for-service made up of 60% in the old system. Now with the reform in place, fee-for-
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service makes up 70% with capitation of 30%. There are places where it is not easy to 
engage and maintain health professionals, and there are places where the inhabitants are 
too small to fill the lists satisfactorily. In these regards, some local authorities have chosen 
to sign up PCPs at fixed salaries to ensure incentive to stay and work. After the reform, 
more than 90% of the PCPs are entrepreneurs, in contrast to less than 70% prior to the 
reform. 98, 5% of the population are listed with a PCP, compared to 67% claiming having 
had a regular doctor before.  
 
3.3 BRITISH HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
Economic theory and common sense validates the fact that the way people are paid has 
significant effects on their working pattern and output. Linking reimbursement directly 
with performance or productivity will tend to incentivise workers to increase service in 
order to make more money. This notice of inefficiency of linking payment with production 
or fee-for-service has motivated, predominantly, UK to the organization of health care 
system that either breaks the links between payment and output or at least severely dilutes 
its effects (Gosden T. 1999).  Fee-for-service systems may be inefficient to some extent 
but other counter-balancing arguments, for example, the presence of a formal ethical code 
for adherence to by doctors may go a long way to take away that incentive to provide 
overtreatment
11
 just to increase income levels. Other systems of payment also go with 
problems. The capitation system in UK has its own weakness.  GPs compete for patients 
on the basis of quality of their care so that by drawing more patients they increase their 
income. However this phenomenon will depend on the ability of patients to observe the 
quality of care, which might be a much unsubstantiated postulation. 
 
These setbacks with capitation prompted the government of England to introduce a series 
of financial motivations to encourage primary care physicians to meet up public health 
goals.  In light of the uncertainties surrounding a single method of payment, the UK 
government introduced a salaried option for primary care physicians to improve the 
quality of care. This option functions alongside the current mixed system of capitation, 
allowances, target payments and fee-for-service. And Norway is no exception. ‗‗In the UK 
                                                 
11
 More service than what is clinically appropriate for the treatment or management of health problem. 
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and Norway, all three types of payments are used‘‘12. Ghana is different from these two 
health care systems by the fact that physicians are mainly paid on salary contrary to mixed 
nature of UK and Norway.  One major difference in the payment methods of the two 
countries is the fact that the UK has recently introduced what is called financial incentives 
to improve quality of care, sometimes called pay for performance schemes (P4P) or  
quality and outcomes framework (QOF). The United Kingdom got on the most go-getting 
of these schemes in 2004 with an initiative in which 25% of general practitioners‘ pay was 
tied to a multifarious set of quality indicators, the quality and outcomes framework (QOF). 
In general with other countries, most of the indicators in the unusual UK framework are 
related to clinical care. These incentives were connected with hastened improvement for 





And more recently, in 2004, United Kingdom dedicated £1.8 billion ($3.2 billion) to a new 
pay-for-performance contract for family practitioners
14
.  The essence of this commitment 
is to reward high-quality care. About 146 performance indicators forms the basis for 
quality measurement and each general practice will be scored on these indicators 
according to measured quality it delivers, and its accrued score will resolve the level of 
payment it receives. This arrangement puts about 18 per cent of the general practitioners 
practice earnings at risk. This quality improvement policy is to complement and further 
dilute the weaknesses of the mixed system
15
 already in place in the British health Care 
System. And it should be stated that this pay for performance or quality improvement 
arrangement is in response to the fact that financiers and payers (in this case the NHS) 
have realised the potential for achieving quality improvements by directly compensating 
measured quality. 
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4.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This contains methodology and a descriptive review of existing literature on physician 
payment mechanisms and their effects on their clinical behaviour. It will throw light on the 
historical development of incentive contracting and payment methods for primary care 
physicians and how the various payment methods in other countries have impacted on the 
quality of health care delivery; cost containment, patient satisfaction etc. A search of the 
literature on physician incentives and their effects will be undertaken and the relevant 
literature would be picked for the review. Much of the literature would centre on the UK 
and the Norwegian experiences in terms of primary care physician payment methods and 
the effects they have on the clinical behaviour of the primary care physicians. Relevant 
examples would also be drawn from different settings to broaden the scope of the study so 
as to be able to draw both the theoretical and practical differences between different 
healthcare systems. 
 
 Capitation, fee-for-service plans, salary, mixed system of payment, physician practice 
patterns, financial mechanisms and general practitioner working practice are some of the 
keywords that would be used for the search. Books, articles and other relevant journals 
would be consulted. Physicians‘ payment designs can shape the quantity of services 
provided, the number of hours worked, how resourcefully the physician works and the 
quality of the services provided, whether physicians refer patients to specialists or 
hospitals rather than treating them themselves, and finally, the overall cost of physician 
services.  
Many  writers and authors have studied and reviewed literature on General Practitioners 
and the effects of various payment methods on their clinical behaviour. Both medical and 
health economics literature have responded to the need to gather more information on 
general practice particularly on the payment methods and their effects (Scott, 2000 and 
Marc Jegers, 2002)
16
. Most of the recent and old literature on this issue almost point to the 
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  Co-authored by Katrien Kesteloot, Diana De Graeve, and Willem Gilles. A typology for  provider 
payment systems in health care 2000. 
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same direction in terms of conclusions. Paying General Practitioners by fee-for-service 
have sent many healthcare systems into escalating healthcare cost since such system 
encourages over utilization of resources and services since General Practitioners receive 
more if they offer more services (McGuire, 2000, Donaldson and Gerard 1989).  
 Theory and empirical predictions have proved that General Practitioners who are on 
salaries are not by any means able to increase their income if they provide more service to 
patients. Regardless of output levels, income remains the same so there is much incentive 
to offer less and lower services to patients. But salaries on the other hand are used in a 
positive way to reduce and contain cost in a context where the healthcare objective is to 
reduce or maintain a certain level of budget (Gosden 1999, woodward 1984).   
 
In view of the pros and cons of singular methods of payments, many systems have now 
responded by adopting mixed systems of payment that combine the advantages of fee-for-
service, capitation and salaries and at the same time dilute the downsides, at least from 
theoretical perspective.  
 
4.1 METHOD  
This narrative review is based on a systematic Pubmed/Medline, Econlit and google 
scholar searchs of the terms; salary or fee-for-service or capitation or reimbursement or 
payment for performance or quality and outcomes framework or incentive in juxtaposition 
with the following: general practitioner or family physician or general practice or primary 
health care or primary physician. The search was limited to studies and publications from 
2000 to 2010 relating to the effects of physician payment methods. As this study is to 
evaluate effects of physician payment methods in UK and Norway, results were limited 
from UK or Norway. The abstracts of the studies identified through systematic searches 
were screened for relevancy and applicability. The full texts of studies were examined 
based on the fact that; they were conducted in Norway or UK, they reported effects of 





4.2 DESCRIPTION OF INCLUDED STUDIES 
Owing to the search strategy and also the characteristics of the subject,   213 studies were 
identified.  After examining titles and removing duplicates and studies not in English, 32 
studies were regarded to merit further examination.  Subsequent to a careful screening of 
abstracts for relevancy, 15 studies were read through among which 10 were selected for 
this narrative review. 1 paper of the included studies is cross-sectional study (Rune 
Sorensen, 2003), 3 studies are time series, Tim Doran 2007, S. M Campbell 2007 and 
David Reeves (2008). 2 studies were longitudinal, Diane Whally 2007, and Christopher 
M. 2007. Only 1 of the included articles is controlled before and after study, T Gosden 
2002 and 1 exploratory study by Luras 2000. The following studies used qualitative 
methods with questionnaire administration and interviews, S.M Campbell 2008, Jostein 
2000. The table below presents literature to be discussed.  
 
1.2 Results and findings of the included studies. 
 
 







Rune J. Sørensen, Jostein 
Grytten: Service 
production and contract 
choice in primary 
physician services, 2003. 
A cross-sectional data 
derived from a 
comprehensive 
questionnaire survey of 
Norwegian primary care 
Physicians. Service 
production for primary 
care physicians was 
measured using 
indicators such as 
number of consultations 
and number of patient. 
The survey was carried 
out in November 1998. 
Physicians with a fee-for-
service contract produced a 
higher number of 
consultations and other 
patient contacts than 
physicians with a fixed 
salary. They find out that a 
change from a salary 
contract to a fee-for-service 
contract will increase 
service production by 20% 
to/40%. Salaried Physicians 
had the least mean number 
of consultations per year: 
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Altogether 2491 primary 
care physicians were 
selected to take part in 
the study. The sample 
was randomly drawn 
from the register of 
doctors held by the 
Norwegian Medical 
Association; this includes 
nearly all primary care 
physicians in the country. 
The response rate of 
66%, which is considered 
to be satisfactory for this 
type of study. The sample 
represents 47% of all 
primary care physicians 
in Norway. 
2341. The average number 
of consultations for contract 
physicians was 1337 higher 
than for salaried physicians. 
Contract physicians also 
had a higher number of 
contacts of other types than 
salaried physicians. 
Contract physicians have 
43% more consultations and 
80% more patient contacts 
of other types compared 
with salaried physicians.  
However,  a part of the 
difference is due to a 
selection effect: 
Salaried physicians prefer 
shorter working hours and 
prefer to work less 
intensively. These results 
demonstrate that type of 
contract has significant 
effects on service 
production.  
The message from this 
research is simple: contract 
design affects primary care 




Jeremy Gray, Sonia 
Saxena, Gopalakrishnan 
Netuveli, Azeem Majeed: 
Impact of a pay-for-
performance incentive on 
support for smoking 
cessation and on smoking 
prevalence among people 
with diabetes, 2007. 
A population-base 
longitudinal study of the 
recorded delivery of 
cessation advice and the 
prevalence of smoking 
using electronic records 
of patients. With diabetes 
obtained from 
participating general 
practices. The survey was 
carried out in an 
ethnically diverse part of 
southwest London before 
(June–October 2003) and 
after (November 2005–
January 2006) the 
introduction of a pay-for 
performance incentive. 
Significantly more patients 
with diabetes had their 
smoking status ever 
recorded in 2005 than in 
2003 (98.8% v.90.0%, p 
<0.001). The proportion of 
patients with documented 
smoking cessation advice 
also increased significantly 
over this period, from 
48.0% to 83.5% (p < 0.001). 
The prevalence of smoking 
decreased significantly from 
20.0% to 16.2% (p < 0.001). 
The reduction over the 
study period was lower 
among women (adjusted 
odds ratio 0.71, 95% 
confidence interval 0.53–
0.95) but was not 
significantly different in the 
most and least affluent 
groups. In 2005, smoking 
rates continued to differ 
significantly with age 
(10.6%–25.1%), sex 
(women, 11.5%; men, 
20.6%) and ethnic 
background (4.9%–
24.9%).The introduction of 
a pay-for-performance 
incentive in the United 
Kingdom increased the 
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provision of support for 
smoking cessation and was 
associated with a reduction 
in smoking prevalence 
among patients with 
diabetes in primary health 
care settings. 
Stephen M. Campbell, 
PhD, David Reeves, PhD, 
Evangelos Kontopantelis, 
PhD,  Bonnie Sibbald, 
PhD, and Martin Roland, 
D.M : Effects of Pay for 
Performance 
on the Quality of Primary 
Care in England (2007)  
An interrupted time-
series analysis of the 
quality of care in 42 
representative family 
practices, with data 
collected at two time 
points before 
implementation 
of the scheme (1998 and 
2003) and at two time 
points after 
implementation (2005 
and 2007). At each time 
point, data on the care of 
patients with asthma, 
diabetes, or coronary 
heart disease were 
extracted from medical 
records; data on patients‘ 
perceptions of access to 
care, continuity of care, 
and interpersonal aspects 
of care were collected 
from questionnaires. The 
analysis included aspects 
Between 2003 and 2005, the 
rate of improvement in the 
quality of care increased for 
asthma and diabetes 
(P<0.001) but not for heart 
disease. By 2007, the rate of 
improvement had slowed 
for all three conditions 
(P<0.001), and the quality 
of those aspects of care that 
were not associated with an 
incentive had declined for 
patients with asthma or 
heart disease. As compared 
with the period before the 
pay-for -performance 
scheme was introduced, the 
improvement rate after 2005 
was unchanged for asthma 
or diabetes and was reduced 
for heart disease (P = 0.02). 
No significant changes were 
seen in patients‘ reports on 
access to care or on 
interpersonal aspects of 
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of care that were and 
those that were not 
associated with 
incentives. 
care. The level of the 
continuity of care, which 
had been constant, showed a 
reduction immediately after 
the introduction of the pay-
for-performance scheme 
(P<0.001) and then 
continued at that reduced 
level. Against a background 
of increases in the quality of 
care before the pay-for-
performance 
scheme was introduced, the 
scheme accelerated 
improvements in quality for 
two of three chronic 
conditions in the short term. 
However, once targets were 
reached, the improvement 
in the quality of care for 
patients with these 
conditions slowed, and the 
quality of care declined for 
two conditions that had not 
been linked 
to incentives. Continuity of 
care was reduced after the 
introduction of the scheme. 
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Toby Gosden, Bonnie 
Sibbald A, Jacky Williams 
B, Roland Petchey C, 
Brenda Leese : Paying 
doctors by salary: a 
controlled study of general 




after study design to 
evaluate the effects of salary 
payment. From the study 
group of 46 salaried pilot 
sites, ten practices were 
sampled in which GPs had 
switched from standard 
GMS contracts to salaried 
contracts without moving 
practice (PMS practices). A 
sample of ten practices 
owned and staffed by 
standard contract GPs (GMS 
practices) was matched to 
the PMS practices in terms 
of the number of whole time 
equivalent (WTE) GPs and 
deprivation amongst the 
patient population. Diaries 
completed by GPs for a 1-
week period in the first year 
of PMS (time period 1: 
December 1998-June 1999) 
and again 1-year later (time 
period 2: December 1999-
June 2000) collected 
information on: time spent 
in surgery, practice 
administration, out-of-hours 
work, and other non-patient 
work; numbers of 
consultations; and the 
KEY 
GMS (General Medical 
Service) =GPs on fee-for-
service and capitation. 
 PMS (Personal Medical 
Service)=GPs on salary. 
 
 
PMS GPs provided relatively 
more surgery consultations and 
saw more patients out-of-hours 
compared with GPs in GMS 
practices. For both surgery and 
out-of-hours consultations, 
PMS doctors were providing 
relatively more consultations 
because the drop in the GMS 
group was greater than that 
observed in the PMS practices. 
Prescriptions were given in 
fewer consultations in PMS 
practices compared with GMS. 
Referral rates in both PMS and 
GMS practices were similar 
and changed little over time. 







proportion of consultations 
in which a prescription was 
given or a referral made. 
Researchers attended on the 
first and last day of each 
diary period to measure 
consultation length.  
Stephen M. Campbell, PhD, 
Ruth McDonald, PhD Helen 
Lester, MD: The Experience 
of Pay for Performance in 
English Family Practice: A 
Qualitative Study 2008.    
 
 
Using a semi structured 
interview format, they 
interviewed 21 family 
doctors and 20 nurses in 22 
nationally representative 
practices across England 
between February and 
August 2007. 
Participants believed the 
financial incentives had been 
sufficient to change behaviour 
and to achieve targets. The 
findings suggest that it is not 
necessary to align targets to 
professional priorities and 
values to obtain behaviour 
change, although doing so 
enhances enthusiasm and 
understanding. Participants 
agreed that the aims of the pay-
for-performance scheme had 
been met in terms of 
improvements in disease-
specific processes of patient 
care and physician income, as 
well as improved data capture. 
It also led to unintended 
effects, such as the emergence 
of a dual QOF-patient agenda 
within consultations, potential 
deskilling of doctors as a result 
of the enhanced role for nurses 
in managing long-term 
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conditions, a decline in 
personal/relational continuity 
of care between doctors and 
patients, resentment by team 
members not benefiting 
financially from payments, and 
concerns about an ongoing 
culture of performance 
monitoring in the United 
Kingdom. 
Iversen, T. And Luras, The 
effects of Capitation on GPs 
referral decisions, 2000. 
 
Exploratory empirical study 
with data from a sample of 
GPs participating in the 
experiment. The 
experimental period was 3 
years.  Data were extracted 
in the municipality of 
Trondheim about the 
number of referrals GPs 
made during the experiment. 
Thirty-three replied, which 
is just above 37% of the GPs 
practising in the 
municipality. One important 
reason for the relatively low 
response rate is probably 
that Norwegian GPs receive 
many questionnaires and 
inquiries from health 
authorities, researchers and 
pharmaceutical firms. 
The result shows that the total 
referral rate increased by 42% 
from 1993 to 1996 when the 
effect of other independent 
variables is taken into account. 
A closer look at the results 
from the estimation shows that 
the effect on the rate of 
referrals to privately practising 
specialists is positive and is 
also statistically significant. In 
a 3-month period, the average 
GP will refer six more persons 
to private Specialists. The 
effect on the rate of referrals to 




Jostein Grytten, Rune 
Sørensen: Type of 
contract and supplier-
induced demand for 
primary physicians in 
Norway 2000. 
 
The main analyses were 
performed on a set of 
data which were 
collected using a 
questionnaire sent to a 
sample of contract and 
salaried physicians in 
1998. From that set of 
data, the effect that 
(supplier-induced-
demand) SID might have 
on the mean number of 
laboratory tests per 
consultation and the 
proportion of 
consultations lasting 
more than 20 min was 
examined. The 
population from which 
the sample was drawn 
encompassed all contract 
physicians (n = 1818) and 
salaried physicians (n = 
564) on the register kept 
by the Norwegian 
Medical Association. 
This register is 
considered to include 
nearly all physicians in 
Norway. The response 
rate for 
Contract physicians was 
68%, and for salaried 
There was no difference in 
the mean number of 
laboratory tests per 
consultation between 
contract and salaried 
physicians. Contrary to 
predictions, contract 
physicians did not have 
more consultations lasting 
for more than 20 min than 
salaried physicians. The 
analyses of physicians‘ 
choice of contract showed 
the expected results-those 
physicians who give priority 
to family, leisure-time and 
community medicine duties 
preferred a salary contract. 
In conclusion, they did not 
find SID for primary 




physicians 57%. The 
non-responders were 
evenly distributed 
according to gender, age 
and place of residence.  
 
Diane Whalley, Hugh 
Gravelle and Bonnie 
Sibbald : Effect of the 
new contract on GPs‘ 
working lives and 
perceptions of quality of 
care: A longitudinal 
survey 2007. 
A longitudinal postal 
survey of English GPs in 
February 2004 and 
September 2005. 
Measures included 
reported job satisfaction 
(7-point scale), hours 
worked, income, and 
impact of the contract. 
The response rate to the 
2004 survey was 54% 
and of the GPs 
responding in 2005, 63% 
responded again in 2005. 
 
Responses were available 
from 2105 doctors in 2004 
and 1349 in 2005. Mean 
overall job satisfaction 
increased from 4.58 out of 7 
in 2004 to 5.17 in 2005. The 
greatest improvements in 
satisfaction were with 
remuneration and hours of 
work. Mean reported hours 
worked fell from 44.5 to 
40.8. Mean income 
increased from an estimated 
£73 400 in 2004 to £92 600 
in 2005. Most GPs reported 
that the new contract had 
increased their income 
(88%), but decreased their 
professional autonomy 
(71%), and increased their 
administrative (94%) and 
clinical (86%) workloads. 
After the introduction of the 
contract doctors were more 
positive than they had 
anticipated about its impact 
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on quality of care. 
Tim Doran, M.P.H., 
Catherine Fullwood, 
Ph.D., Hugh Gravelle, 
Ph.D., David Reeves, 
Ph.D., Evangelos 
Kontopantelis, Ph.D., 
Urara Hiroeh, Ph.D., 
and Martin Roland, 
D.M.: Pay-for-
Performance Programs in 
Family Practices in the 
United Kingdom 2007. 
Analysed data extracted 
automatically from 
clinical computing 
systems for 8105 family 
practices in England in 
the first year of the pay-
for-performance program 
(April 2004 through 
March 2005), data from 
the U.K. Census, and 
data on characteristics of 
individual family 
practices. They examined 
the proportion of patients 
deemed eligible for a 
clinical quality indicator 
for whom the indicator 
was met (reported 
achievement) and the 
proportion of the total 
number of patients with a 
medical condition for 
whom a quality indicator 
was met (population 
achievement), and they 
English family practices 
attained high levels of 
achievement in the first year 
of the new pay-for-
performance contract. A 
small number of practices 
appear to have achieved 
high scores by excluding 
large numbers of patients by 
exception reporting. More 
research is needed to 
determine whether these 
practices are excluding 
patients for sound clinical 
reasons or in order to 
increase income. The 
median reported 
achievement in the first year 
of the new contract was 
83.4 percent (interquartile 
range, 78.2 to 87.0 percent). 
Sociodemographic 
characteristics of the 




used multiple regression 
analysis to determine the 
extent to which practices 
achieved high scores by 
classifying patients as 
ineligible for quality 
indicators (exception 
reporting). 
and practices (size of 
practice, number of patients 
per practitioner, age of 
practitioner, and whether 
the practitioner was 
medically educated in the 
United Kingdom) had 
moderate but significant 
effects on performance. 
Exception reporting by 
practices was not extensive 
(median rate, 6 percent), but 
it was the strongest 
predictor of achievement: a 
1 percent increase in the 
rate of exception reporting 
was associated with a 0.31 
percent increase in reported 
achievement. Exception 
reporting was high in a 
small number of practices: 1 
percent of practices 
excluded more than 15 








Tim Doran, Catherine 
Fullwood, Evangelos 
Kontopantelis, David 
Reeves: Effect of 
financial incentives on 
inequalities in the 
delivery of primary 
clinical care in England: 
analysis of clinical 
activity indicators for the 
quality and outcomes 
framework 2008. 
Data extracted 
automatically from clinical 
computing systems for 
7637 general practices in 
England, data from the UK 
census, and data for 
characteristics of practices 
and patients from the 2006 
general medical statistics 
database. Practices were 
grouped into equal-sized 
quintiles on the basis of 
area deprivation in their 
locality. The overall levels 
of achievement were 
calculated, defined as the 
proportion of patients who 
were deemed eligible by 
the practices for whom the 
targets were achieved, for 
48 clinical activity 
indicators during the first 3 
years of the incentive 
scheme (from 2004–05 to 
2006–07). 
Median overall reported 
achievement was 85·1% 
(IQR 79·0–89·1) in year 1, 
89·3% (86·0–91·5) in year 
2, and 0·8% (88·5–92·6) 
in year 3. In year 1, area 
deprivation was associated 
with lower levels of 
achievement, with median 
achievement ranging from 
86·8% (82·2–89·6) for 
quintile 1 (least deprived) 
to 82·8% (75·2–87·8) for 
quintile 5 (most deprived). 
Between years 1 and 3, 
median achievement 
increased by 4·4% for 
quintile 1 and by 7·6% for 
quintile 5, and the gap in 
median achievement 
narrowed from 4·0% to 
0·8% during this period. 
Increase in achievement 
during this time was 
inversely associated with 
practice performance in 
previous years (p<0·0001), 
but was not associated 







4.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND PREDICTIONS FROM THEORY 
The principal objective of the literature review was to discover the link between empirical 
evidence and theoretical predictions of effects of physician payment systems. Some of the 
evidences from the review give mixed messages. For example,  Rune J. Sorensen 
discovered that fee-for-service GPs ordered more tests, more consultations and patients 
contacts than salaried physicians whiles  Gosden T. did not find the same results in a 
controlled before and after study in UK. An earlier study by Jostein and Sorensen in 2000, 
did not find any differences in service production between salaried and fee-for-service 
physicians. These findings seem to present contradicting information. Whiles some studies 
support theoretical predictions, others do not. Iversen T and H. Luras 2000, used 
exploratory study to confirm that patient list system or capitation can influence referral 
rates. GPs under capitation were found to have increased their referral rates by 42% after 
the new payment system was implemented.  
 
All the studies on QOF or P4P in the UK have some agreement on the general improvement 
of quality after the introduction of the reforms.  There were improvements in some aspects 
of clinical care over and above the underlying trend after the introduction of a pay-for-
performance scheme (Stephen M 2007). In 2008, the same authors used interrupted time-
series analysis to find out that QOF has brought accelerated improvement in quality of care. 
In the Christopher M. Studies 2007, notably more patients with diabetes had their smoking 
status ever recorded in 2005 than in 2003. The fraction of patients with documented 
smoking cessation advice also increased considerably over this period and the prevalence of 
smoking decreased also. Diane Whalley and Tim Doran 2007, made similar findings about 
the effects of P4P in the UK.  The trend of the studies in UK supports theoretical 
predictions.  
 
 By conclusion, it can be said that empirical evidence supports the theory and predictions of 
QOF or P4P. This is from the fact that the literatures reviewed have shown improvements 
in quality of service delivery and also physicians‘ satisfaction in terms of pay increases. 
Capitation, as expected is proven to increase referral rates and may therefore not contain 
cost as already thought about. Referrals may reduce primary care cost but there could be 
cost transfer from primary care to specialists. The price would be paid at the secondary 
level which might be very more expensive. The findings did not give strong evidence to 
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5.0 POSSIBLE LESSONS FOR GHANA 
5.1 HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN GHANA  
Ghana is a country of about 23 million inhabitants. The country is located on the west coast 
of Africa, about 750km north of the equator, between the latitudes of 4 º -11.5 º north. The 
total land area of the country is 238,540 km
2
.  The country is bounded on the north by 
Burkina Faso, on the west by Cote d‘Ivoire, on the east by Togo and on the south by the 
Gulf of Guinea.  
 The Ghana healthcare system has gone through so much financing arrangements. Before 
independence, health care was free for expatriates, Gold coast support workers and opinion 
leaders. After independence, health care was fully free for government officials and 
workers including school pupils and students. Token fees were introduced in 1972 and 
Significant fees introduced in 1985 ―cash and carry‖17 backed by Legislation. The aim was 
to recover 15% public sector operating costs. However major problems with financial 
access and equity especially for expensive illness episodes became a public issue.  
 
 This and other problems prompted the government of Ghana in 2003, to introduce the 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) with the slogan ‗Sharing our care the traditional 
way‘ when it was fully launched (Ministry of Health, 2002). The introduction of Ghana 
Health Insurance was partly trigged by evidence, politics, donors and the international 
financial organizations. The scheme uses barely salaries for remunerating physicians. Cost 
containment might be the major reason for implementing such a low intensive resource 
utilization technique when the majority of Ghanaians may not have access to basic 
healthcare services.  
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Under the new financing arrangement (National Health Insurance Scheme NHIS), where 
health to a large extent would be financed by taxes and premium contributions as 
summarised below;  
1. 2.5 % SSNIT contribution of workers (Social Security Contributions) 
2.  2.5% VAT levy of selected goods and service 
3. Minimum premium of 72,000 cedis (7.74 U$) per annum from informal workers, 
4. Parliamentary approval from the consolidated fund. 
5. Donation, grants, gifts other voluntary contributions 
6. Money that may accrue from the investment by National Health Insurance Company 
(NHIC). 
The government and for that matter the Ministry of Health set goals and objectives for the 
country‘s healthcare system; 
1. Assure equitable universal access for all residents in Ghana to an acceptable quality of 
essential health services. It is compulsory for all residents in Ghana to belong to at least one 
of the three types of permissible schemes. 
2. To replace ―Cash and Carry‖. The old system  is to be done away with and create access 
to benefit package irrespective of one‘s socio-economic status.  Meanwhile, healthcare 
expenditures should be made within budget targets to control and contain cost. 
3. Ensure every resident in Ghana belong to a health insurance scheme within five years 
from start of the programme.  
4. Risk Equalization: risk of illness is equally shared among all; hence, disease burden and 
mortality pattern shall serve as one of the basis for the allocation of funds to geographical 
areas in the country. This was to be based on the following design principles;  
Cross subsidization:  
1. Ability to pay (Graduated premiums) 
2. Rich subsidizes the poor 
3. The healthy subsidizes the sick 
4. The economically active adults pay for children, indigents and the aged. 
5. Quality care: Value for money. 
6. Solidarity: Vulnerable group- children, aged and the poor need the support of the healthy. 





Over the past four decades, Ghana has implemented several health policies aimed at 
reforming the healthcare sector (Krasovec. K., and Shaw, R. (2003). These policies include 
Free Health Care policy, Cost Sharing (user fees), Cash-and-Carry System and more 
recently, the National Health Insurance Scheme. The government has also embarked on 
organizational and policy changes which has brought into being a decentralized health 
service, the establishment of the Ministry of Health as an autonomous institution by an Act 
of Parliament etc. The key objectives of these reforms relate to issues such as improving 
equity of access to services, effectiveness of care, efficient utilization of resources, cost 
containment and control, satisfaction of users, and sustainability as stated above. 
 
5.2 LESSONS FOR GHANA FROM THE REVIEWED STUDIES 
Ghana‘s vision for the new reforms in 2003 as stated by the Ministry of Health, 2002, says 
to assure equitable universal access for all residents in Ghana to an acceptable quality of 
essential health services.  The Government is also keen to ensure efficiency and maintain 
expenditure within budget allocations.  And further,  the new health care reforms have been 
summarised as, to replace ―Cash and Carry‖,  ensure every resident in Ghana belong to a 
health insurance scheme within five years from start of the programme, equal access to 
benefit package irrespective of one‘s socio-economic status, risk of illness is equally shared 
among all; hence, disease burden and mortality pattern shall serve as one of the basis for the 
allocation of funds to geographical areas in the country. With these objectives and vision, 
there is no doubt that GPs have a part to play to make the reforms fruitful. 
  
For Ghana‘s health sector to achieve a reasonable and satisfactory level of its set objectives, 
great lessons should be learnt from the Norwegian and the U.K systems. Obviously, most 
developed economies like Norway and U.K, have responded to the weaknesses of singular 
methods of remunerating GPs. Salaried GPs are known to order less tests, longer 
consultation times and less regard for ensuring accessibility of care just because income is 
well known in advance and so changes in output do not affect physician earnings.  So there 
is no incentive to improve quality, yet alone to make use of office hours efficiently.  
 Some writers argue from a perspective that, the nature of physician socialisation and training 
serves as enough check to guide their decisions to be mainly based on patients‘ health status. 
This argument is not so much supported by existing literature at least not by this review. 
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Consequently, since salaried GPs are associated with lower levels of tests and less intensive 
care provision, the argument follows that it can be a great tool for cost containment if the 
health care objective is to contain or maintain a certain level of budget.  
 
However, this theoretical prediction was not fully supported by the literatures reviewed. In 
the Gosden 2002,  referral rates were similar and even though fee-for-service Physicians 
provided relatively more surgery and consultation than salaried Physicians, the authors found 
the results to be scientifically insignificant. Also, in Jostein 2000,  opposite to predictions,  
fee-for-service Physicians did not have consultation period different from salaried physicians 
and that incidence of supplier induced demand was not found. However, in Rune 2003, as 
predicted, fee-for-service Physicians undertook more consultations and other patients‘ 
contacts. These disagreements over salaries and fee-for-service make it difficult to predict 
any lesson for Ghana. However, this should challenge the Government of Ghana to undertake 
scientific research into the effects of these payment methods. 
  
From the objectives of Ghana health care, universal accessibility ranks very prominent. 
This requires motivated GPs to ensure more patients are taken care of. Fee-for-service 
could be a good tool to ensure universal coverage. At least from the literature reviewed, 
Rune J. Sørensen, Jostein Grytten, 2003 showed that fee-for-service GPs produce higher 
patient contacts and consultations than salaried GPs. Doctors make more money if they 
treat more illnesses and undertake more clinical procedures.  Again I will say that more 
insight and research are needed into the link between fee-for-service and access to health 
care. The culture and the economic circumstances in Ghana would have to be taken into 
account on GPs attitudes to financial incentives. As Jostein Grytten, 2000, indicated, GPs 
preferences affect their choice of contract. GPs who would like to enjoy family life and 
have more leisure time would prefer salary contracts. 
 
 With the introduction of pay for performance in UK, great lessons can be learnt by Ghana 
and Norway even though not so much studies have evaluated the impacts so far. Available 
evidences show that quality is improving at least for certain chronic diseases (the table 
above). However, these evidences of the impacts of physician payment methods may not be 
vigorous enough to be fully applied in every policy context. Therefore it should be the 
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interest of Governments and other stakeholders to evaluate these payment methods, if at all 
possible, use randomised controlled trial studies or prospective study designs if relevant.  
 
Since Ghana uses salary as the major payment mechanism, there might be the need to 
consider other options depending on what the country wants to achieve.  The evidences 
available from Norway and U.K plus other studies will give Ghana very good lessons for 
any major policy reforms of its general practice especially in the area of physicians‘ 
payment methods. And it must be stressed that any major policy in this area must take into 
account the economics of principal-agent theory. As already explained, the tendency for 
physicians to pursue selfish interest ahead of the principal complicates the design of 
incentive systems. All the systems that link performance to payment like FFS, QOF or P4P 
may give an unscrupulous agent the chance to offer more service than needed by the 
patients just to increase income. In this wise, Ghana will have to adopt other control 
measures in order to limit the agency problems if any reform are to be carried out within its 
primary physicians‘ remuneration system.  
 
The area of cost control and containment has been a concern to health care policy makers. 
Ghana is not an exception. With the new health insurance system, health administrators are 
required to spend within budgetary allocations. This objective cannot be achieved easily 
alongside other equally important ones. Capitation have been known to contain cost but the 
findings of Luras, 2000, shows that GPs increase their referral rates which could transfer 
cost from primary care to secondary health care Institutions. In the end, cost would not be 
contained because every referral would go a long way to increase Government expenditure. 
And besides, treating patients at the primary level is less expensive than referring to 
specialists.  
 
From the review so far, a combination of fee-for-service, capitation and salary could be a 
better option than barely implementing a singular method as currently exists in Ghana. 
Also, pay for performance can be an option as has been experimented in the UK in areas of 
chronic disease management. Maybe the current reform needs further reforms to position 
GPs rightly in the general practice in order to achieve the objectives and the healthcare 
vision of Ghana. In conclusion, I will say that this review cannot predict an optimized 
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This paper represents an attempt to study the impact of payment methods on GPs‘ 
behaviour in the U.K and Norway and to analyse if there are lessons Ghana can learn and 
apply given the socio-economic system and cultural values of Ghana. Bearing in mind the 
small number of studies, the methodological quality included in this review is variable.  
 
The very objectives of this review were to unearth facts on PCPs behaviour with regard to 
the way they are paid. The first was the impact of payment methods on health care cost, 
whether payment methods can increase cost or contain cost. In the Rune J. S and Jostein 
G, 2003, physicians with fee-for-service produce higher number of consultations and other 
forms of patient contacts than physicians with fixed salary. They found out that changing 
from salary to fee-for-service had the potential of increasing service production by 20%-
40%.  These results demonstrate that type of contract has significant effects on service 
production. This finding is supported by Davidson, 1992, who found that the number of 
primary care physicians visits in the new fee-for-service group was greater than the 
number provided by capitation doctors.  
 
A similar study by Kristiansen and Hjortdahl 1992,  on GPs in Norway pointed to the 
same direction. They support the findings of Rune J and Jostein G. Fee-for-service GPs 
were likely to order more urine tests, more likely to have shorter consultations, more likely 
to undertake home visits than salaried GPs.  However, Gosden, 2002, did not find the 
same with British NHS. Even though, PMS GPs provided relatively more surgery 
consultations and saw more patients out-of-hours compared with GPs in GMS practices. 
For both surgery and out-of-hours consultations, PMS Doctors were providing relatively 
more consultations because the drop in the GMS group was greater than that observed in 
the PMS practices. However, none of the above was statistically significant and he 
concluded that switching to salary payment may not adversely affect GP productivity or 
quality of care. GPs on salary payment did not behave as expected with regard to the 
number and length of surgery consultations, surgery hours worked, time spent working 
out-of hours, list sizes or prescribing. Also, regardless of the incentive to do so, there was 
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no difference in the mean number of laboratory tests per consultation between contract and 
salaried physicians. Contrary to predictions, contract physicians did not have more 
consultations lasting for more than 20 min than salaried physicians, (Jostein Grytten, Rune 
Sørensen (2000)).  
The authors did not find supplier-induced-demand among Norwegian physicians. This is 
reinforced by earlier study of the Canadian system by Hutchison 1996, who found out that 
when payment method was changed, capitation did not lower hospitalization rates. 
However, the results of this study must be interpreted cautiously since the response rate 
for both salaried physician and fee-for-service physicians were 57% and 68% respectively. 
Even though the response rate is that high, the other non-responders could change the 
entire outcome of the study. In summing up, there is inconsistent evidence to believe that 
the quantum of services offered by primary care physicians under fee-for-service was 
greater than that provided by salaried physicians in both Norway and England. 
 
Secondly, an important issue that warranted this study was whether quality of service 
delivery and patient satisfaction could be achieved under any of the methods of payments. 
In tackling this question, it is likely that capitation, in order to attract more patients may 
offer more service as a sign of quality and also deliver services that reduce future cost, for 
instance, health promotion, and preventive care etc. Also, Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) or Pay for Performance was expected to convey greater incentive to 
meet targets leading to high quality and expenses, increased administrative etc since GPs 
receive more upon meeting the quality indicators targets.  
 
The Christopher Millett study, 2007, found out that, significantly more patients with 
diabetes had their smoking status ever recorded in 2005 than in 2003. The proportion of 
patients with documented smoking cessation advice also increased significantly over this 
period. The prevalence of smoking decreased significantly ( see table 1.2). Thus, the 
introduction of a pay-for-performance incentive in the United Kingdom increased the 
provision of support for smoking cessation and was associated with a reduction in 
smoking prevalence among patients with diabetes in primary health care settings. This 
conclusion is supported by Tim Doran, Catherine Fullwood, Evangelos Kontopantelis, 




Also, M Campbell, 2007, found that between 2003 and 2005, the rate of improvement in 
the quality of care increased for asthma and diabetes but not for heart disease. By 2007, 
the rate of improvement had slowed for all three conditions , and the quality of those 
aspects of care that were not associated with an incentive had declined for patients with 
asthma or heart disease. No significant changes were seen in patients‘ reports on access to 
care or on interpersonal aspects of care. Also, in 2008, the same authors found out from a 
semi-structured interview with some British nurses and PCPs who believed that the 
financial incentives had been sufficient to change behaviour and to achieve targets. The 
Participants agreed that the aims of the pay-for-performance scheme had been met in 
terms of improvements in disease-specific processes of patient care and physician income 
and satisfaction, as well as improved data capture.   
 
Whalley, (2007), made similar findings. The mean overall job satisfaction among GPs 
increased. The greatest improvements in satisfaction were with remuneration and hours of 
work. Most GPs reported that the new contract had increased their income (88%), but 
decreased their professional autonomy (71%), and increased their administrative (94%) 
and clinical (86%) workloads. GPs in UK, according to this study, were more positive than 
they had anticipated about its impact on quality. 
 
In conclusion, it seems that quality of care has improved with the introduction of the pay 
for performance scheme in UK. The evidence concerning access to care and GPs job 
satisfaction and quality of care given seems to agree. The methodological weakness 
inherent in some of the studies, for instance, Stephen M. Campbell, 2008 interviewing 22 
and 21 doctors and nurses respectively may weaken his findings. Therefore, strict 
conclusions about quality improvement with the introduction of pay for performance may 
be misleading. None of the studies included reported on how capitation or salary or fee-
for-service affects quality of service. However, the Luras study 2000, examined the impact 
of capitation on GPs referral rates.  The authors did not consider the relationship between 




Another issue intended to be addressed by this review was the link between capitation and 
referral rates among PCPs, whether capitation increases referral rates. The expectation was 
that capitated PCPs would refer patients to specialists in order to reduce cost (Stearns et al. 
1992). One of the studies reviewed (Iversen/Luras 2000) examined the issue of referral 
rates among physicians in the Norwegian health care system. There was evidence that the 
overall referral rate increased by 42% within a period of three years during the 
experimentation. This finding is contrary to an earlier study in Ontario, Canada. The 
author, Hutchinson 1994, found out that hospital utilization rates and GP referral rates did 
not differ between capitated and fee-for-service practices. 
 
 However, Iversen and Luras are supported by the Krasnik 1990 study which investigated 
the effects of a change from capitation system to a mixed of capitation and fee-for-service 
on the practice patterns of a sample of GPs in Copenhagen city. After the change, the rates 
of examinations, diagnostic, and curative services were significantly higher. Rates of 
referrals to hospitals and specialists however decreased remarkably.  This is a clear 
message that introduction of fee-for-service remuneration as compared with capitation 
payment alone may encourage doctors to increase utilization of their own service, reduce 
referral rates and reallocate their time to more profitable services.   Thus the conclusion 
reached by Iversen and Luras may have support from the empirical literature. However, a 
response rate of 37% renders the outcome of the study quite unreliable to make a 
generalization. 
 
The issue of accessibility of health care service is very critical for many health care plans. 
Christopher Millett, 2007, found out that more patients with diabetes had their smoking 
status recorded under the new QOF system. He used a population-based longitudinal study 
in south London.  The outcome confirms that introduction of a pay-for-performance 
incentive in the United Kingdom increased the provision of support for smoking cessation 
and was associated with a reduction in smoking prevalence among patients with diabetes 
in primary health care settings. So it can be argued here that physicians‘ clinical decisions 
are not only determined by patients‘ health status but also, the payment methodology. 
Thus these findings add to existing literature that doctors when given apposite incentive 
(fee-for-service), can manipulate demand for health care service and as a result patients‘ 
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use of services. As noted by Hickson, Gerald B. (1987), this finding substantiates, with 
direct evidence, the observation made by Rossiter and Wilensky (1983) that physicians 
induce or initiate demand for care. 
The applications of the findings of the included studies were not scientifically assessed 
and can be questioned. There were different GPs and nurses involved in the studies and 
the background and context of each study were very diverse. The different professional, 
organizational and cultural settings between practices and countries would affect the 


















   7.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of the literature reviewed confirm that selection of payment methods is not a 
nonaligned verdict and has considerable policy and practice connotations. The degree to 
which these factors influence care patterns depends on the interplay of financial 
incentives, disincentives, urgency of patient need and the doctor‘s value system. In this 
thesis, a description of the health care systems, in particular physician remuneration 
systems, in Norway, UK and Ghana were made. My objective was to look at the impacts 
of these systems to find if there are possible lessons Ghana can learn from these two 
countries given the health care objectives and socio-economic situation in Ghana.   
 
The literature review give a variety of effects on the behaviour of GPs. Payment systems 
and financial incentives do influence the behaviour of primary care providers. However, 
how precisely and to what degree depends on a number of other influences such as ethical 
and professional constraints and the context of the health system. Thus, the practice of one 
country with payment systems and financial incentives cannot easily be repeated in 
another country – even if there is a soaring degree of civilizing and institutional 
similarities.  
 
Much has been published on effects of payment systems and financial incentives on 
primary care physician behaviour. However, most of these publications cover the 
anticipated and expected effects of payments systems and financial incentives only. 
Moreover, in general, empirical evidence from studies with high methodological values is 
scarce. The methodological standards alone probably make the results of studies into 
elements of payment systems less applicable. The quality of the included studies is 
variable.  Data constraints, faulted methods and researchers‘ biases among other problems 
render some of the studies less robust to draw strict conclusions. However, some of the 
findings of the included studies are supported by empirical evidences from the health 





There were disagreeing evidences over the effects of fee-for-service and salaries. While 
fee-for-service is known to be a strong incentive for intensive resource utilization, the 
studies reviewed did not agree with each other and therefore one cannot firm up the 
theoretical predictions of either salary or fee-for-service. 
 
Primary care physicians paid by capitation were found to have more referrals to specialists 
and to hospitals. As supported by Krasnik 1990, higher referral rates are more costly to the 
society if the same sickness or illness can be treated by a GP. So therefore capitation my 
not necessarily be a cost effective technique if not were regulated especially in the area of 
referrals and also capitation ought to be well adjusted to achieve its goals.  
 
Finally, the QOF or P4P has been tested to be a strong incentive for chronic disease 
management, high quality service delivery and physician satisfaction. Even though most 
of the studies included did not take account of patients‘ opinions, the outcomes cannot be 
completely ignored. Therefore, to conclude, I will say that it is not so simple to predict 
with confidence an optimal payment system for primary care physicians.  Even though it is 
known that payment systems have effects on GPs behaviour, much more robustic research 
is required before policy recommendations can be made.  Effects of payment methods are 
quite demanding to assess in health care systems where remuneration systems do not 
change and different methods do not exist in the same setting. The use of superlative study 
designs like randomised control trials (RCT), is rarely feasible on the fact that GPs income 
are at stake. The used of other study designs have therefore been the major limitation in 
the literature reviewed here in this thesis.  
 
Based on the findings of the study, some recommendations should be noted: 
Reforms should be predicated on proper identification of the health care needs of the 
people so that policies can be well tailored to meet the needs of the service users. Policy 
reforms such as the salary system in Ghana seemed to have not considered the needs, 
preferences and accessibility of patients to quality health care and the overall health care 
objectives of Ghana.  Scientific studies should be used to identify the best possible 
payment method for GPs in Ghana. Many health care plans are moving towards a mixed 
of the three basic methods, and Ghana can experiment it if even on a pilot bases.  
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Health sector policy reforms should be holistic in dealing with all the elements essential to 
providing health care that meets the needs of the users. For example, to manage chronic 
diseases, experience in UK shows that the QOF or P4P has been very positive and 
therefore Ghana and Norway can experiment it. It seems to be so far so good with the 
reform which the UK introduced in 2004. The evidences available show that quality and 
accessibility as well as physician satisfaction have improved. This is a good basis for any 
country to undertake a trial before actual reformation. 
 
Many a time policy makers get busy with manipulating physicians with financial 
incentives without pondering over doctors‘ office quality. It is recommended that more 
explicit guidelines should be adopted on the way doctors perform their clinical duties in 
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